LEI 11079 DE 2004 PDF

A EPL disponibiliza sua agenda de autoridades e seu manual de identidade visual. This Law establishes general norms for public-private partnership tenders and contracts within the Federal Government, States, Federal District and Municipalities. Sole paragraph. This Law shall apply to entities of the direct Public Administration, special funds, agencies, public foundations, state-owned enterprises, corporations with mixed public and private capital and other entities that are directly or indirectly controlled by the Federal Government, States, Federal District and Municipalities. A public-private partnership is a concession contract, in the sponsored or administrative forms.

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An analysis of public-private partnership contractual incentives in Brazilian citizen service centers. This research uses a multiple case study approach to assess theoretical propositions from transaction costs economics, the theory of incentives, and the theory of incomplete contracts.

The Poupatempo and the Unidades de Atendimento Integrado UAI , which are two major Brazilian regional citizen service centers, were the cases selected based on an unusual opportunity: the parallel occurrence of two different arrangements of public-private partnership, applied to the same public service. Poupatempo has expanded its network of units since by building partnerships through outsourcing, whereas UAI has applied the Brazilian legal framework for public-private partnership to develop its services.

Also, subsidiary semi-structured interviews allowed the observation of non-contractual variables. As a consequence, potential benefits and results of public delegation have been left aside in recent scholars work Ribeiro, ; Rosilho, By answering this question with a managerial approach based on incentives and performance we look forward to contribute to the local literature on public outsourcing and PPPs. This contractual arrangement has an objective and frame distinct from PPPs.

Global debate about best practices for citizen service deliver is sound and developed and today looks towards concepts as open government Askim et al. Theoretical development has gone hand to hand with best local government experiences worldwide. In Brazil, however, although some scholars have kept pace with international issues, government practices have lacked behind, still focusing on citizen service centers based on the one stop-shop OSS model.

In OSS policies different governmental institutions offer their services in one single location, allowing citizens to gather the necessary information and to obtain the demanded services with a single journey.

The model results in a sort of public services shopping center Askim et al. Both keep many similarities based on the same OSS model. This case selection, however, happened based on the particularity of these two public policies amongst other similar local cases: to offer its services relying on private companies under different contractual incentive arrangements. These governmental partnership practices are recent alternatives in the local context for this sort of public activity and are yet to be object of further research Ferrer, ; Majeed, Until the s the only method government could apply to delegate public activities to private agents was to contract it out.

Regulated in the s, outsourcing keeps the state responsible to build and operate an infrastructure allowing it only to hire private companies for subsidiary products and services. Thus, by outsourcing government is bounded to design and perform with in-house work or hire a private agent to project and execute the necessary task, thus, bearing the entire enterprise financial burden. The fiscal charge, however, is parceled throughout the contract. Therefore, through this organizational frame, government can at most transfer to the private actor some activities for an agreed fee.

Outsourcing does not involve any sort of public asset sale. Further, contracting out allows the private agent little room for autonomy leaving it obligated only to deliver the acquired product on time. Remuneration usually occurs according to a fixed periodic amount with little variation depending on performance Rosilho, On the other hand, public-private partnerships PPPs were regulated in Brazil in with a distinct scope from its international acronym. While PPPs globally denote a wide range of public-private frameworks Bovaird, , Brazil developed the concept of PPPs as a defined advancement from the concessions structure created in Brito and Silveira, PPPs are associated with major infrastructure enterprises which require large investment, such as roads and railway constructions.

Source: Elaborated by the author. Based on the case study skill of congregating different information sources, this research conducted a multiple case study based on documents, reports, and interviews Yin, This research is not a strictly qualitative or quantitative research, benefitting from these two sorts of analysis.

The researcher gathered all Poupatempo outsourcing contracts and performance reports signed by Prodesp between and and UAI - Phase I contract and performance reports. The developed contract analysis classified Poupatempo and UAI documents according to the same criteria. Due to verified changes over time in these reports, however, it was only possible to make a consistent examination of the last 12 months of the Poupatempo program for 57 centers.

Still for this period not all data was available for every center, resulting in an average monthly sample of observations for each of the seven program indicators contained in its contracts.

The quantitative comparison between the contractual indicators of both programs was made in steps. First, a descriptive analysis of the data for each of the indicators of the two programs allowed a general picture.

Further, it was possible to make a single statistical comparison using a T-Student test for the only indicator that was identical in both contracts, the satisfaction survey. On top of the strictly formal analysis of contracts and reports, eight interviews were conducted with managers of different levels and activities of the two public policies. Once the public nomination of interviewees could set their positions at risk, each one of them is thereby identified by the surname Silva and received a name starting with letters from A to H according to the interviews chronology.

As these interviews involved experts on the studied subject, they were conducted as elite interviews Leech, As much as possible respondents were allowed free talking Dexter, Although scripts for semi structured were prepared with objective questions, respondents were rarely interrupted and they could explain their views freely Leech, Scholars debate on public delegation to private partners developed as series of opposing waves preaching the state absolute efficiency or inefficiency.

Some recent economic scholars, however, relativized this analysis by seeking to study through individual situations. Thus, we address specifically some of this recent theories: transaction cost economics Williamson, , , , incomplete contracts Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, and theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole, For these three currents there is no absolute model of state efficiency or inefficiency, but levels of organization efficiency depending on the transaction to be executed. Transaction cost economics studies the economic cost involved in reaching an agreement, monitoring and controlling it when setting a transaction Williamson, , , Transaction costs are present in all delegation of economic activity Williamson, Its extent can justify the internalization of activities in a firm or its externalization in a market relation Coase, Transaction costs can be classified as ex ante and ex post the start of the economic relation.

In opposition, ex post transaction costs happen due to monitoring, adjusting, correcting behaviors and maintaining extra-judicial governance structures to resolve disputes Williamson, Ex ante and ex post costs are correlated. The drafting and negotiation of a comprehensive and complex agreement that provides a range of future possibilities and allocate property rights and responsibilities can save ex post transaction costs.

On the other hand, less detailed contracts allow greater room for negotiation as unforeseen situations occur, resulting in cheapening ex ante transaction costs and more expensive ex post transaction costs Williamson, , In transaction costs economics, the key elements considered of any transaction are its frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty. Although some authors attribute most explanatory power to asset specificity, according to Williamson frequency and asset specificity would be meaningless without uncertainty as there would be no need for transaction adjustments Williamson, Hence, according to this proposition, a transaction more susceptible to uncertainty has higher transaction costs.

Further, transactions vulnerable to an additional risk of probity should not be contracted from a third party as they present a higher transaction cost. Probity is understood as loyalty and rectitude when providing an activity Williamson, The risk of probity is present in every transaction but its intensity varies.

Foreseeing all transaction components and possible events in a contract is impossible due to bounded rationality Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, Qualitative variables are particularly hard to be predicted in contracts leaving it more vulnerable when contracted.

As cost reductions are presumed to have negative effects on quality and, quality improvements positive effects on costs, delegating qualitative transactions presents an intrinsic higher risk.

This brings particular risk to delegating government activities which cannot be fully contractually described Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, Further, unlike civil servants, private company employees have incentives to reduce costs risking quality provision, hence, adding an extra risk Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, On top of that, incentives that reward an agent to devote more attention to an activity or aspect of a task necessarily reduce expended attention to other jobs.

For this reason, establishing an agency relationship for the provision of services with multiple objectives may be even riskier Holmstrom and Milgrom, Laffont and Tirole typify incentive structures in economic regulation and public procurement initiatives.

In their view, public procurement occurs when government pays for the activity, being both the regulator and the buyer of that object. On the other hand, economic regulation means government does not expend resources on that private activity, but merely regulate the object leaving its citizens to purchase it.

The authors consider two distinct criteria in their model: transference of public resources as compensation and incentives intensity Laffont and Tirole, In this category, high intensity incentives occur in contracts where the government pays a fixed price. In these cases, the company would be the sole beneficiary of its cost reductions, as government does not remunerate according to the realized cost, but as a previously agreed price.

So, in order to increase its profit, company will focus on reducing its cost. Structures with low intensity incentives occur in cost-plus contracts, in which the government pays the firm as a return margin on its incurred cost. Therefore, in cost-plus contracts a potential increase in private costs would be transferred to government.

Finally, the intermediate incentive intensity occurs in contracts with incentives, in which the government and the contractor share costs or profit according to some contractual rule. Source: Laffont and Tirole This research, therefore, seeks to empirically observe some of the highlighted theoretical propositions in the two selected cases. To facilitate this discussion, we summarize the theoretical propositions we aim to observe. Since , Poupatempo has outsourced its centers to the private sector, changing deeply its working governance.

Scholars works on Poupatempo focused on its creation and the benefits it has provided to the local population Annenberg, ; Paulics, or tend to develop on the cutting red tape principles that inspired it Painelli, As a result, over the research on this public policy the impact of the recent outsourcing strategy seems to occupy a secondary role.

Between to Poupatempo installed its first network of 10 centers which ran based on public servants. Since , its network expanded from 10 to 67 centers. Therefore, Poupatempo has different management models amongst its network. Contracts of all kinds, however, were signed by Prodesp which remains responsible for the entire Poupatempo program.

Regardless of the governance model to which it is associated, Poupatempo contracts are almost identical. Each contract contains the same payment formula, same time length, have very similar technical requirements and have the same quality indicators. Amongst the 49 contracts examined, heterogeneity was limited to: number of contracted centers; to foresee an implementation or an physical adaptation requirement or not; the set of services to be provided; quantity of working positions postos de atendimento to be supplied.

Thus, aside from the implementation or physical adaptation requirement, the remaining variations occur due to the sizing of the comprehended centers. The Poupatempo Mobile Centers have a clear contractual distinction, its physical equipment. This is the only case amongst the Poupatempo contracts in which the venue provision is contained in the contractual scope as a private obligation. Among the 49 contracts analyzed, six could be distinguished as Mobile Center contracts, each encompassing a single center.

In the remaining contractual variables, however, these contracts are no different from any of its pairs. Finally, it must be safeguarded that the original Public Administration Centers follow a distinct administrative logic. Therefore, as there is no whole public-private framework employed on Public Administration Centers, these centers are kept aside from this examination.

Amongst the analyzed Poupatempo contracts there are contracts comprehending one to five Integrated and Advanced Management centers. The sizing decision of each contract is based on each center dimension and projected demand, thus, seeking to ensure attractiveness for the bidding companies Silva, a.

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Brasília: Ten Years of PPP Law

ISSN The delivery of the so-called higher education services is not exclusively attributed to the State according to the Master Plan in the Brazilian context, which is different from the concept of higher education as a right granted by the State, according to Article of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. In the current regulatory framework, a conception oriented towards the production of technological innovation is reinforced; the productivity of universities is measured according to the logic regulated by the Technological Innovation Act a , which sets forth the establishment of partnership agreements between universities and the market according to the rules of the Public-Private Partnership Act b. Such regulatory framework brings continuations and a deepening of the construction of a concept of higher education as a commercial service, redefining the citizen as a user or a consumer of those services.

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